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The topic of this symposium, "The Judiciary," is timely and
vital. In recent years, as candidates have waged ever more expen-
sive and partisan election campaigns for judicial office, the ten-
sion between judicial independence and judicial accountability
has commanded significant attention within the bench, the bar,
and the academy.' Although the tension plays out most practi-
cally in the debate over appointed versus elected judges, it is
more fundamentally a debate about the judiciary's role in a dem-
ocratic society, about the nature ofjudging, and about the nature
of law. With the rich array of points of view and methodologies
that they bring to bear on these questions, the articles and notes
in this symposium sum up to an important and fresh contribu-
tion to the literature.
The articles by Professors Geyh2 and Dimino3 frame the
debate over independence and accountability. As both authors
relate-even as they try to find ways to mediate between the stan-
dard positions-the basic fault line in the debate is a jurispru-
dential one. On the one side-the side of judicial
independence-lies a formalist view that law is knowable, and
that legal reasoning is an objective enterprise that ought to be
protected from political influences. On the other side-the side
of judicial accountability-lies the realist-critical-attitudinal view
that law is politics, and that legal reasoning is a mask for choos-
ing naked political preferences that ought to be subjected to
democratic control. Their articles, as well as the student note by
Rachel Luberda,4 reject this simplistic dichotomy, and seek a bal-
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School.
1. See, e.g., Symposium, Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State
of the Judiciary, 95 GEO. L.J. 895 (2007).
2. Charles Gardner Geyh, Straddling the Fence Between Truth and Pretense:
The Role of Law and Preference in Judicial Decision Making and the Future of Judicial
Independence, 22J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 435 (2008).
3. Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Accountability Before the Fact, 22 J. L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'V' 451 (2008).
4. Rachel Luberda, The Fourth Branch of the Government: Evaluating the
Media's Role in Overseeing the Independent Judiciary, 22 J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'V
507 (2008).
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ance that reflects a view of the law as indeterminate but not nec-
essarily radically political as it is applied on the ground.
The articles by Professors Lubet,
5 Hellman,6 and Engler 7
then examine, from various perspectives, the intersection
between judicial independence, judicial accountability, and the
ethical rules that pertain to judicial behavior. Professor Lubet
argues that loosening the ethical restrictions on judicial speech
in campaigns and elsewhere might have the unintended conse-
quence of subjecting judges to more politicized attacks in the
"marketplace of ideas." Professor Hellman critiques the new
rules on judicial misconduct, arguing that even more openness
in the process of investigating complaints would enhance the
credibility, and thus the independence, of judges. Professor
Engler advocates a more active, and less umpireal,8 stance for
judges when one party is unrepresented.
Professor Wendel' and Justice Keyes" ° use the foundational
jurisprudential question of the nature of law as their jumping-off
points for reflecting on the obligations of the judiciary. Both start
with the Hart/Dworkin debate over whether it is possible to dis-
tinguish legal from political sources of reasoning. After also
blending in comparative insights of civilian and common-law sys-
tems, Professor Wendel concludes that labeling judicial decisions
as "legal" or "political" is unfruitful, and that a requirement that
judges provide reasons for their decisions acts as a sufficient
response to concerns about political speech by judges as well as a
sufficient check on "failures ofjudicial impartiality." Justice Keyes
argues that the law is systematically moral; thus, contrary to
Dworkin's position, a judge's strict adherence to the law best
advances the moral and social-justice aims of the law. Beginning
instead from the vantage point of Catholic moral theology, a stu-
5. Steven Lubet, Judicial Campaign Speech and the Third Law of Motion, 22J.
L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 425 (2008).
6. Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New
Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules, 22 J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 325 (2008).
7. Russell Engler, Ethics in Transition: Unrepresented Litigants and the Chang-
ingJudicial Role, 22 J. L. ETHICS & Pun. POL'Y 367 (2008).
8. Cf Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA.
L. Ruv. 1031 (1975) (critiquing the adversarial system's capacity for finding the
truth).
9. W. Bradley Wendel, Impartiality in Judicial Ethics: A Jurisprudential Analy-
sis, 22 J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'v 305 (2008).
10. Evelyn Keyes, Two Conceptions ofJudicial Integrity: Traditional and Perfec-
tionist Approaches to Issues of Morality and Social Justice, 22 J. L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 233 (2008).
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dent note by Eric Parker Babbs" argues that pro-life Christian
judges cannot, consistent with their religious obligations, author-
ize parental-bypass orders for minors seeking abortions because
doing so materially cooperates in evil.
Finally, Judge Anderson uses the story of a routine day
processing his criminal docket, and the defendant who throws an
unexpected monkey wrench into the slowly grinding mill of the
criminal-justice system, as the basis for reflection on the modern
judicial system, the nature of redemption, and the importance of
moral vision. 2
Putting into juxtaposition the legal, ethical, political, philo-
sophical, moral, and theological dimensions of legal issues is the
goal of the Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, and in this issue
the editors have so admirably succeeded in their task that I have
been left wondering what additional scraps of wisdom I might
impart to the reader. Let me sketch two brief ideas from my own
perspective as a proceduralist. The first is a comparative point;
the second an historical one.
First, I take it that modern adjudication has four principal
tasks: declaring the law, finding the facts, applying the law to the
facts, and (when appropriate) shaping a remedy.'3 Different
legal systems allocate roles, rules, and responsibilities in different
ways in order to accomplish these tasks. Observers who have
described the procedural systems of the Soviet Union and Maoist
China have noted the pervasive influence of the Communist
Party in the legal system. Institutionalized in the office of Party
officials known as procurators, the purpose was to ensure that
judicial decisions conformed to the goals of the Communist
Party. 4 Procurators enjoyed significant powers-including the
powers to institute lawsuits and to intervene in private lawsuits
that affected the Party's interests-that made them, at least in
cases of some political significance, the most influential figure in
the legal system. At the same time, procurators were often criti-
cized for failing to take action in many serious disputes, such as
11. Eric Parker Babbs, Pro-Life Judges and Judicial Bypass Cases, 22J. L. ETH-
ICS & PUB. POL'y 473 (2008).
12. Leland P. Anderson, A "More Excellent Way": Moral Imagination & the
Art of Judging, 22 J. L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y - (2008).
13. See SUZANNA SHERRY & JAY TIDMARSH, CMIL PROCEDURE: ESSENTIALS
11-13 (2007).
14. For descriptions of the work of procurators, see MARY ANN GLENDON
ET AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS (1985); SHAO-CHUAN LENG JUSTICE IN
COMMUNIST CHINA (1967). Cf Stephen C. Thaman, Reform of the Procuracy and
Bar in Russia 3 PARKER SCH. J. E. EUR. L. 1 (1996) (discussing changes in the
procuracy after the breakup of the Soviet Union).
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environmental or other litigation that we might call "public law"
in nature, that might call the actions of the government into
question.
Whether fair or not, Americans probably do not regard the
judicial systems of Soviet Russia and Maoist China as the pin-
nacles of judicial integrity. To the contrary, the phrases "show
trials" and "kangaroo courts" frequently come to mind. The par-
ticular reason why we carry this image is, I suspect, because we
are skeptical that judges can dispassionately carry out the four
tasks of adjudication that I have described-particularly, the
tasks of finding the facts and applying the law to those facts-
when they are subjected to the constant oversight of the
Procuracy, which keeps a vigilant eye on the consistency between
judicial outcomes and the government's political preferences.
And we are particularly skeptical that judges in such an environ-
ment can act neutrally when challenges to the actions or policies
of the government are put into the dock.
I do not mean to criticize too harshly the office of the procu-
rator. As Mirjan Damaska points out, procedural rules can be
expected to look very different when a government takes an
activist, policy-implementing stance toward its people and when
its judicial system is hierarchically ordered.' 5 But that system is
not our system. As Damaska also points out, Americans adopt a
far more laissez-faire attitude toward government, and a more
decentralized and diffused approach to governmental and judi-
cial power. Our very different experiences and expectations of
government and judicial power make us suspicious of such
efforts to guide individual lawsuits toward the preferred social
outcome.
If we substitute the phrase "the People" for the phrase "the
Procuracy," we make the argument for greater judicial accounta-
bility. We hold judges accountable to the will of the people; we
make them conduits for the policies that a majority of citizens
prefer. Rather than institutionalizing the role of articulating and
achieving preferred social policy in the procurator, we use elec-
tions to instantiate that role in the judge. In the Soviet Union
and China, there existed at least the formal distinction between
the judge and the official designated to assure that judicial out-
comes accorded with social preferences; those who wish to hold
judges accountable for their ability to smoothly transmit
majoritarian preferences into judicial decisions eliminate even
that formal distinction.
15. MIRJAN DAMASKA, THE FACES OFJUSTICE AND STATE AUTHORITY (1986).
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I do not, of course, wish to be understood as suggesting that
those who favor greater judicial accountability are closet Commu-
nists or totalitarians. But I do wish to point out the contradiction
between strong notions of judicial accountability (at least as
understood to mean thatjudges who fail to render decisions con-
forming to majoritarian preferences should be voted out of
office) and the nature of the American legal and political order.
-Americans tend to regard courts as a place to resolve disputes
that arise in the course of their private ordering of affairs, rather
than as a place to transmit previously determined social policies
into reality. We tend to diffuse judicial power through layers of
court systems and even to lay citizens on juries, rather than to
force a lock-step mentality that insists on close judicial conform-
ity with the stated (or intuited) preferences of the polity.
One objection to this argument is to point to the American
jury, which already seems to translate social preferences into
legal outcomes; expecting judges to do the same seems no great
breach of faith in American justice, especially when judicial elec-
tions advance the goal of American democracy. To a large
extent, however, this observation misses the mark. The mythic
nature of American juries derives from their countermajoritarian
stance-from their ability to provide justice to individuals when
properly enacted laws do not. 6 Moreover, the combination of
the requirement of unanimity (or near-unanimity) in jury ver-
dicts and the requirement of cross-sectional representation on
venire panels makes juries imperfect mechanisms for translating
the will of the majority into verdicts. In this sense, juries in the
American system occupy the same (and not perfectly worked
out) relationship to majoritarian decision-making as judges who
engage in judicial review of a statute's constitutionality.' 7 Ameri-
can courts are not designed to be-as the courts of some com-
munist, socialist, and civilian systems are-an organ for the
frictionless transmission of sovereign policy into judicial
outcomes.
My second, and historical, point starts with the jury. When
the United States was founded, juries enjoyed a power they no
16. When the law that the jury encounters is a rule of common law, when
the judges promulgating that rule are not elected, and when thejury's decision-
making process "nullifies" that rule, the jury sometimes-but not always-is
achieving the outcome that the majority would prefer. When the law that the
jury "nullifies" has been enacted by the representative branches of government,
however, juries act in a clearly countermajoritarian way.
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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longer do: a power to determine both the facts and the law,"8 free
of all but a limited judicial influence. In the past two centuries,
the history of the American jury has been schizophrenic. On the
one hand, the growth of legal claims,19 the demolition of legal
barriers such as no-duty rules,20 and the abolition of the straight-
jacket of the writ system 2' allow American juries the opportunity
to weigh in on a range of disputes that lay beyond the imagina-
tion of the founding generation. On the other hand, the past two
centuries have witnessed a constant erosion of jury autonomy in
decision making, as the power to determine the law has been
taken from juries and devices such as judgments as a matter of
law, summary judgment, and formalized rules of evidence have
effectively cabined jury factfinding 2
In more recent years,judges have also been invested, at least
on the civil side, with great discretion during the pretrial process,
and have assumed the mantle of case managers who often seek to
achieve settlements rather than litigated resolutions of lawsuits.
23
Often the choice of which case-management techniques to use-
and which not to use-has a direct bearing on the outcome of a
case.2 4 Moreover, trial rates have plummeted in recent years;
criminal cases plead out, and civil cases settle. Today fewer than
1.5% of all federal civil cases reach trial. About two-thirds of that
small set are jury trials.
25
In this litigation environment, the judge has become a tow-
ering figure. 26 Due to its limited use, the natural counterweight
18. See Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly Argument: The Juiy and the His-
torical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 997, 1025-37 (2007).
19. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Authority in the Dock, 69 B.U. L. REv. 469
(1989).
20. See Robert Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociole-
gal Change, 23 VAL. L. REv. 1 (1988).
21. See SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 13, at 16-30.
22. See Lawrence M. Friedman, Some Notes on the Civil July in Historical Per-
spective, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 201 (1998).
23. SeeJay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
513, 553-62 (2006); see alsojudith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 74
(1982).
24. For an examination of some case-management techniques and their
capacity to influence outcomes, seeJAY TDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COM-
PLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSrEM 878-1384 (1998).
25. See SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 13, at 96; cf Marc Galanter, The
Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRIGAL LEGAL STuD. 459 (2004) (reporting 1.8% trial rate with
1.2% jury trials in the early 2000s).
26. See generally Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976) (describing the ways in which the judge's author-
ity in public-law cases exceeds traditionally exercised powers).
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to judicial authority in many cases-the jury-is functionally
irrelevant as an antidote.27 The rules of procedure enhance,
rather than constrain, judicial power; and when procedural rules
do not provide sufficient power, judges, often invent new proce-
dural authority under the rubric of "inherent power."28 I can
think of no time in American history when judges were as proce-
durally powerful as they are today. Given this reality, and given
the American distrust of concentrations of power, strong argu-
ments for judicial independence (at least as understood to imply
a lack of accountability for the use or abuse ofjudicial power) are
as unappealing as strong arguments for judicial accountability.
What seems to be needed is some "virtue theory ofjudging":
an acknowledgment that judges are not simple conduits for the
preferences of the majority, but also a recognition that they are
to exercise their countermajoritarian powers wisely and mod-
estly. As the related difficulty of specifying the limits on the
power of judicial review has shown, however, it is impossible to
specify a single such theory of judging. Indeed, as many of the
contributors to this issue acknowledge, consideration of the judi-
cial role begins with consideration of the nature of law-an
equally if not more contentious subject than theories of judicial
review or theories of judging.
The questions, and their consequences for the American
judiciary, are profound. For this reason, I am grateful to the
authors in this symposium for helping all of us to think through
them more deeply.
27. This statement does not mean that the institution of the jury is irrele-
vant. Obviously, many settlements occur in the shadow of the jury, as parties
negotiate based on their assumptions about what the jury will do. Likewise, the
default mechanism for resolving most cases remains jury trial, so the jury exer-
cises a significant influence over the shape of the American litigation system. See
SHERRY & TIDMARSH, supra note 13, at 74-97.
28. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REv. (forth-
coming 2008) (copy on file with author); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent
Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IowA L. Ruv. 735 (2001).
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